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 We explore theoretically and empirically whether social interaction, including local and 
global interaction, influences the incidence of corruption. We first present an interaction-
based model on corruption that predicts that the level of corruption is positively 
associated with social interaction. Then we empirically verify the theoretical prediction 
using within-country evidence at the province-level in China during 1998 to 2007. Panel 
data evidence clearly indicates that social interaction has a statistically significantly 
positive effect on the corruption rate in China. Our findings, therefore, underscore the 
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One who stays near vermilion gets stained red,   
and one who stays near ink gets stained black. 
                                                                                                           
—— Xuan Fu (Jin Dynasty) 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Corruption is a widespread phenomenon affecting human societies throughout time and space. 
Contemporaneous corruption scandals not only occur in developing countries such as Nigeria, 
India, and China but also in developed economies such as France, Germany and United States. 
Even in Scandinavian countries, like Sweden and Norway, supposedly free-from-corruption, 
managers of state owned companies have been found to be taking bribes (for an overview see 
Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
   Corruption in the public sector is recognised to be the greatest obstacle to development 
(Kaufmann, 1997). A higher levels of corruption is associated with lower investment and 
economic  growth  (Mauro  1995;  World  Bank,  1997).  Corruption  weakens  the  effect  of 
industrial policies and induces private sectors to violate tax and regulatory laws. Foreign 
direct  investment  is  also  depressed  by  the  high  level  of  corruption  (Wei,  2000). 
Anticorruption policies are therefore very important since corruption can induce great harm 
to countries. Some stress that bribery may increase overall efficiency of an economic system 
(e.g., Lui, 1985). However, Rose-Ackerman (1999) argues that issues such as tax evasion, 
violation of environmental rules, certification of unqualified people for public benefit, and 
grants of immunity to organized crime reduce efficiency. In addition, bureaucrats have an 
incentive  to  delay  transactions  in  order  to  extract  higher  payments  (see  Rose-Ackerman, 
1997). 
   Reducing corruption requires a thorough understanding of its causes. A sizable literature 
has  emerged  to  investigate  the  determinants  of  corruption.  Current  research  associates 
corruption  with  cultural  tradition,  economic  development,  political  institutions  and 
government  policies.  For  example,  in  his  comprehensive  cross-country  study,  Treisman 
(2000) finds that Protestant traditions, history of British rule, long exposure to democracy, 
higher average income and high levels of imports lead to a decrease of corruption, while 
decentralization  encourages  it.  Brunetti  and  Weder  (2003)  present  evidence  that  press 
freedom can control corruption. Using a within-country data set, Glaeser and Saks (2006) 3 
 
document  that  economic  development  and  education  decrease  corruption  while  income 
inequality and racial fractionalization may increase corruption in America. However, few 
have explored the impact of social interaction on corruption. A notable exception is Goel and 
Nelson (2007) who, with state-level U.S. data between 1995 and 2004, show that the effect of 
neighbouring  corruption  on  local  corruption  is  significantly  positive.  In  other  words, 
corruption is contagious. Contagion effects have been observed in other illegal activities such 
as assassinations, hijackings, kidnappings, and serial murders as referred to by Bikhchandi, 
Hirshleifer and Welch (1998). The relevance of social interaction and crime is explored by 
Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) who focus on the United States (across cities and 
across precincts in New York). The results indicate that social interaction models provide a 
framework for understanding variances of cross-city crime rates. Individuals are more likely 
to commit crimes when those around them do. Focusing on corruption, Dong, Dulleck and 
Torgler (2008) find using cross-sectional micro data that conditional cooperation matters. The 
willingness  to  engage  in  corruption  is  influenced  by  the  perceived  activities  of  other 
individuals. 
   In this paper we explore the effect of social interaction on the incidence of corruption 
theoretically  and  empirically  in  the  context  of  China.  China  is  an  interesting  country  to 
analyse,  not  only  because  it  is  the  largest  transitional  and  developing  country,  but  also 
because  corruption  has  become  more  rampant  in  China  since  economic  reforms  were 
launched in 1978. Even the Chinese government has admitted that corruption ―is now worse 
than during any other period since New China was founded in 1949. It has spread into the 
Party,  into  government  administration  and  into  every  part  of  society,  including  politics, 
economy,  ideology  and  culture‖  (Liang,  1994,  p.  122).  Such  widespread  corruption  has 
caused severe  consequences  in  China, including  economic losses  estimated to  have been 
between 13.2 and 16.8% of China’s GDP in the late 1990s (Hu 2001). Not surprisingly, such 
rampant  corruption  has  generated  much  literature,  especially  in  sociology  and  political 
science (e.g., White, 1996, and Gong, 2006). From an economic perspective, Yao (2002) 
argues that corruption in China is generated by the Chinese political system, which grants and 
protects privileges. With a unique corruption measure, Cai, Fang and Xu (2009) find that 
corruption  has  a  substantially  negative  effect  on  the  productivity  of  Chinese  firms. 
Nevertheless, there is a lack of studies that comprehensively analyse economic underpinnings 
of corruption in China. We therefore explicitly study the impact of social interaction on the 
incidence  of  corruption,  and  find  a  statistically  significant  relationship  between  social 4 
 
interaction and corruption. It suggests that like other crimes, the incidence of corruption is 
significantly affected by social interaction. The rest of this paper is structured as follows: 
Section  II  presents  a  theoretical  model.  Section  III  describes  our  empirical  analysis  and 
results. Section IV concludes the paper.   
 
II. THEORETICAL MODEL 
In this section we investigate theoretically  social interaction in the context of corruption. 
Following  Aidt’s  survey  (2003),  we  identify  three  related  theoretical  articles,  which  are 
summarized  in  Table  1  below.  These  articles  provide  stylized  facts  related  to  social 
interaction, but cannot explain thoroughly the effect of social interaction on the incidence of 
corruption because they do not introduce social interaction explicitly into their models. In 
terms of social interaction theory, Sah (1988, 2007) and Avdvig and Moene (1990) only 
study the effect of local interaction, while Lui (1986) simply investigates the effect of global 
interaction
1.   
 
Table 1      Literature summary 
                                  Crucial point            Approach                    Stylized fact 
Lui (1986) 
It is harder to audit corrupt officials in 





The different levels of 
corruption across regions under 
the same deterrence scheme 
Sah (1988, 2007) 
An individual’s perception of the 
corruption level is stochastically 
influenced by the real level that he faced 
in the past, and this perception affects his 
current and future corrupt act, which in 
turn exert stochastic influences on the 




The different levels of 
corruption across regions 
Avdvig and Moene     
(1990) 
The probability of corruption is related to 
its established frequency. 
Simple dynamic model  The different levels of 
corruption across regions 
 
   Nevertheless, a growing body of research considering the role of social interaction in 
economic outcomes has emerged during the last two decades. According to Zanella (2004, p. 
4),  social  interaction  is  the  ―direct  interdependences,  not  mediated  by  markets  and 
enforceable contracts, between individual decisions and the decisions and characteristics of 
others within a common sociological group‖. Economic models that have embedded social 
interaction  ―seem  particularly  adapt  to  solve  a  pervasive  problem  in  the  social  science, 
namely the observation of large differences in outcomes in the absence of commensurate 
                                                           
1  We will discuss these terms later. 5 
 
differences in fundamentals‖ (Scheinkman, 2008, p. 2). Sah (1991) states that an individual’s 
environment  influences  their  propensity  for  crime  and  explaines  the  obvious  difference 
between the crime participation rates of societal groups with similar economic fundamentals. 
With two models of social interaction, Glaeser, Sacerdote and Scheinkman (1996) provide a 
framework to interpret the cross-city variation in crime rates. 
   In line with the social interaction research we employ the interactions-based approach 
(Blume and Durlauf, 2004) to explore bureaucratic corruption. Specifically, we use the binary 
choice  model  with  social  interactions  developed  by  Brock  and  Durlauf  (1995)  to  model 
corrupt behaviour. 
   We  consider  a  population  of  I  homogenous  bureaucrats.  In  the  presence  of  social 
interactions, each bureaucrat chooses one of two actions: corruption or non-corruption, which 
is  coded  by      {    }.  The  space  of  all  possible  sets  of  actions  by  the  population  is 
denoted by              . Thus                              represents the choices 
of all bureaucrats other than i. 
   The utility of the bureaucrat i is assumed to be 
 
                                                     (     
      )                                                                           
 
Here                  is a private component of the utility.         is the deterministic private 
utility decided by the bureaucrat i’s choice, which is expressed below, as: 
 
                                 
                                            {
                   
          
                                                                                      
 
Here     represents the bureaucrat’s wage,     is the bribe a corrupt bureaucrat accepts and    
the probability that his corrupt act is not detected. A corrupt bureaucrat will lose his job and 
hence all his income if his corrupt act is detected. Let     
         
     and    
         
  , 
we can easily rewrite         into the form 
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         is  the  random  private  utility  independently  and  identically  distributed  across 
bureaucrats. In our model it represents the moral shock (moral cost) of taking one of the 
actions. Following Brock and Durlauf (2001) and Glaeser and Scheinkman (2002), we further 
assume that          is extreme-value distributed. Thus the difference between          and 
       is logistically distributed, 
                
                                       
             ⁄                                                                          
 
       
         in (1), however, is the social component of the utility, namely social utility 
associated with a bureaucrat’s choice. We assume that it captures a pure conformity effect, 
hence, 
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Here        >0 are measures of the disutility of nonconformity.    
       denotes the bureaucrat 
i’s subjective expectation of the bureaucrat j’s choice. With above assumptions we have, 
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Since the bureaucrats are homogenous, we can assume that       
 
            , and     
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The joint set of choices obeys (because      is independently distributed), 
 
                                                              ∏
 
                         
 
                                         
 
It is obvious that the corrupt decision of a bureaucrat depends on his expectation of others’ 
decisions. However, there are two different ways in which each bureaucrat interacts with 
others,  namely  local  interaction  and  global  interaction.  According  to  Brock  and  Durlauf 
(2001),  local  interaction  means  that  each  bureaucrat  interacts  directly  only  with  his 
neighbourhood  in  the  population,  while  global  interaction  implies  that  each  bureaucrat 
interacts  directly  with  every  other  bureaucrat  of  the  population.  Actually,  people  often 
interact  with  each  other  in  both  ways  though  they  assign  different  weights  to  these 
interactions. To reflect this fact, we assume, 
 
                                                            
                 
                                                          
 
where the expectation formed from the local interaction can be further expressed as, 
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    is the number of bureaucrat i’s neighbours. And the expectation formed from the global 
interaction, on the other hand, can be expressed as,   
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We eventually have following equations 
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From above we can deduce, 
 
                                   
             
   
     
       
      
   
     
                                                                                  
  
             
   
     
         
      
    
     
                                                                                   
 
We  therefore  conclude  that  the  social  interaction,  including  local  interaction  and  global 
interaction, does matter in a corrupt act. As can be seen in (15) and (16) the incidence of 
corruption is positively related to both local interaction and global interaction. 
 
 
III. EMPIRICAL WORK 
The  model  above  generates  two  testable  implications  on  the  relationship  between  the 
incidence of corruption and social interaction, presented in equations (15) and (16). We plan 
to test these implications using within-country panel data of China. 
3.1    Data and Methodology 
Among related studies, Goel and Nelson (2007) use the cross-sectional within-country data of 
America, while Attila (2008) and Dong, Dulleck and Torgler (2008) employ cross-country 
data sets. We prefer within-country panel data in such a context. Studies on corruption could 
have attributed the different levels of corruption to the cultural and institutional difference 
across  regions,  rather  than  social  interactions.  In  addition,  one  can  stress  that  social 
interactions are triggered by the institutional condition within a country. Thus, it is difficult to 
estimate the importance of social  interaction in  explaining the different  corruption  levels 
across  countries.  If  we  use  cross-country  data,,  cultural  and  institutional  variation  across 
countries are hard to proxy and fully control. Using within-country data, especially those of a 
country homogenous in culture and institutions like China, however, can mitigate this kind of 
problem.  Moreover,  we  can  further  control  for  regional  heterogeneity  when  using 
within-country panel data since it provides control for the state- and time- invariant variables 
in the econometric analysis (Hisao, 2003). 
   Goel and Nelson (1998), Fisman and Gatti (2002) and Glaeser and Saks (2006) use the 
corruption  convictions  of  states  to  measure  state-level  corruption  in  America.  We  use  a 9 
 
similar measure, namely the registered cases of corruption in provincial procurator’s offices, 
to proxy the provincial corruption level in China. Using conviction data
2  has the strength of 
dealing with a less subjective measure of corruption offering also the opportunity to work 
with longer time spans. In addition, they are not subject to the problems of sampling error and 
survey non-response (Glaeser and Saks, 2006). On the other hand, there is the disadvantage  
that  the conviction rate is driven by the quality of  the detection process. The weakness, 
however, will not trouble us in our current study since the quality of local judicial systems in 
China is basically homogeneous. In addition, we will control local  anti-corruption efforts in 
our regressions. 
   Following the definition of global interaction, we use the average of corruption levels in 
the  neighbour  provinces  to  measure  the  global  interaction  between  bureaucrats ,  which 
therefore can also be called the  neighbouring effect. According to  the definition of local 
interaction, we need to find the average corruption level of closely interacting bureaucrats at 
the beginning of a period when a bureaucrat makes a corrupt decision.   We assume that 
closely  interacting  bureaucrats  are  bureaucrats  within   the  same province.  We  therefore 
choose the corruption level of this province in the last period to proxy the local interaction 
between bureaucrats in the province, which hence can be also referred to as the historical 
effect. Sah (2005, p. 6), e.g., stresses ―(…) if their past experiences have convinced some 
bureaucrats that cheating is more pervasive in the economy, then they are more likely to 
choose to be corrupt…Through these dynamic relationships, future levels of cheating and 
corruption in the economy become explicitly linked to past levels of cheating and corruption 
in the economy…‖. 
   Besides the key  variables discussed above  we also  employ  a set  of control  variables 
which  are  commonly  used  in  corruption  regressions  to  minimize  omitted  variable  bias. 
Treisman (2000) suggested that corruption is associated with historical and cultural traditions, 
levels of economic development, political institutions and government policies. Since there 
are no substantial differences in history, culture and institutions between Chinese provinces, 
we only focus here on the economic and policy controls. Similar to Goel and Nelson (1998), 
                                                           
2  Theoretically, conviction rates and the number of registered cases of corruption are different. However in 
China they are actually the same. In most cases in China suspect officials are first investigated by the discipline 
inspection commission of the Chinese Communist Party and its local branches. Only after they have obtained 
enough  evidence,  the  discipline  inspection  commissions  will  refer  corrupt  cases  to  the  procuratorates,  and 
procuratorates then register the cases. Furthermore the courts and the procuratorates are both controlled by the 




we use provincial per capita expenditures for police, procuratorate, court and judiciary to 
proxy anticorruption efforts of each province. This is also important as we are focusing on 
registered cases of corruption (influenced by regional anticorruption efforts). According to 
the two comprehensive studies on the causes of corruption, Treisman (2000) and Glaeser and 
Saks (2005), more educated and richer areas have less corruption. These studies also suggest 
government regulation and the relative wage of the public sector as potential determinants of 
corruption. Ades and Di Tella (1999) show the tendency that an increase in rents, due to the 
discovery of natural resource or a decrease in competition, leads to an increase in corruption. 
Furthermore,  Fisman  and  Gatti  (2002)  find,  contrary  to  Treisman  (2000),    that  fiscal 
decentralization depresses corruption in America. As mentioned in the introduction, Brunetti, 
and Weder (2003) also show that the media substantially controls corruption. Finally, Swamy, 
Knack,  Lee  and  Azfar  (2001)  find  that  countries  with  more  parliamentary  seats  held  by 
women tend to have less corruption. We therefore control for such potential determinants of 
corruption. The detailed description of all the explanatory variables is presented in Table 2. 
We  measure  female  representation  in  politics  in  Chinese  provinces  with  the  female 
representation in the National People’s Congress, the only legislative house in China. In line 
with Zhang and Zou (1998) we use the ratio of per capita provincial government expenditure 
to  per  capital  central  government  expenditure  to  proxy  fiscal  decentralization  among 
provinces. 
    
 
Table 2        Variables description (1998—2007) 
Variable  Description    Mean  Std. Dev.  Source 
Cases  Provincial registered cases on corruption in procurator’s 
office per 100,000 population 
3.14  0.96 
China Procuratorial 
Yearbook 
Border  Unweighted average of Cases in neighbouring provinces  3.04  0.64 
Anticorruption  Per capita expenditure for police, procuratorate, court 
and judiciary 
112.43  103.41                                   
China Statistical 
Yearbook 
Income  Logarithm of per capita gross provincial product  9.15  0.63 
Education  Fraction of the population with college completed  5.44  4.31 
Wage  Ratio of government employee’ wage to average wage  1.13  0.13 
Openness  Ratio of export to gross provincial product  14.45  22.62 
Decentralization  Ratio of per capita provincial consolidated spending to 
per capita central consolidated spending 
38.20  19.52 
Resource  The fraction of employment in the mining sector  4.93  3.75 
Regulation  Relationship between the market and the government  6.72  2.04  Fan, Wang, and Zhu 
(2010) 
Media  Annual newspaper circulation per capita  41.38  88.07  China Statistical 





Because the definition and thus statistical calibre of the crime of corruption and bribery was 
changed with a 1997 amendment to China’s criminal law, we ensure comparability by 
collecting data only for 1998 to 2007. Looking at the summary of corruption levels by region, 
there is a fairly wide degree of regional variation that ranges from 1.77 in Tibet to 5.01 in 
Tianjin (see Table A1 in the Appendix). 
Our basic specification is as follows:   
 
                                                              
                                                                            
 
where i and t denote provinces and years respectively and j is the lag value.      indicates 
unobserved province fixed effects. The vector          includes all control variables discussed 
above. We choose one-year lagged values for explanatory variables because there must be 
intensive investigations before the corruption cases are registered in the procurator’s offices.   
   We first perform pooled OLS to obtain primary results. However, to identify the causal 
effect of social interaction on corruption, we need to address the endogeneity problem in our 
estimation. We first include province fixed effects in our panel regressions to control for 
unobserved  provincial  characteristics  influencing  both  corruption  and  its  determinants 
especially  social  interaction  to  deal  with  potential  endogeneity  biases.  Mo  (2001,  p.  70) 
describes a corruption problem as ―an institutional problem that lasts for a long period‖. Thus, 
since the major source of potential bias in our regressions may be time-invariant historical 
factors, we choose fixed-effect regressions as the most suitable tool for  investigating the 
relationship between corruption and social interactions. 
    However, fixed effect regressions do not necessarily estimate the causal effect of social 
interaction on corruption. First, fixed effects regressions cannot remove endogeneity biases 
generated  by  time-varying  omitted  factors  affecting  both  corruption  and  its  determinants 
(especially social interaction). Second, the lagged independent variable          -   is indeed 
correlated  with         for         ,  which  according  to  Wooldridge  (2002),  biases  our  fixed 
effects  OLS  estimation.  The  standard  strategy  to  deal  with  such  potential  biases  is  the 
instrumental variables method. Anderson and Hsiao (1981) suggest to first-difference the 
equation like (17) to remove individual effects:   
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        -   is then used as the instrument for           -   to obtain more consistent estimates 
since it is uncorrelated with         as long as          are not serially correlated. However, the 
instrumental  variable  estimator  suggested  by  Anderson  and  Hsiao  (1981)  is  not  efficient 
because all further lags of            can also be used as additional instruments as they are 
uncorrelated with      . Arellano and Bond (1991) therefore derive a GMM estimator with all 
these instruments to estimate the model more efficiently than the Anderson and Hsiao (1981) 
estimator.  Furthermore,  based  on  Arellano  and  Bover  (1995),  Blundell  and  Bond  (1998) 
develop a system GMM estimator since the above lagged-level instruments in the Arellano 
and Bond (1991) estimator becomes weak when the autoregressive process is too persistent in 
the dynamic model. In their system estimator lagged differences are used as instruments for 
the level equation such as (17) while the lagged levels are used as instruments for an equation 
such  as  (18).  We  therefore  estimate  our  model  with  this  Arellano-Bover/Blundel-Bond 
system estimator. In our case the lags of              are used as its instruments since there 
might  be  a  reverse  causality  between          and          .  Using  the  same  method  we 
instrument  some  other  corruption  determinants,  namely  income,  education,  openness  and 
regulation which might potentially be endogenous. 
   The correlation matrix (Table A2) in the Appendix indicates potential multicollinearity 
issues.  To  minimize  the  consequence  of  multicollinearity,  we  first  adopt  a  parsimonious 
specification including only measures of social interactions and anticorruption efforts. Then 
some control variables which are not highly correlated with each other are added into the 
specification. Finally we run regressions with all the discussed control variables. The process 
allows us also to better check the robustness of the results.   
3.2    Results 
The findings are presented in Table 3. We start with OLS estimation to obtain primary results 
(see specification (1), (4), and (7)). Then fixed effects regressions are performed to deal with 
a  potential  endogeneity  bias  (see  specification  (2),  (5)  and  (8)).  Finally,  the 
Arellano-Bover/Blundel-Bond system estimator is used to get the results (see (3), (6), and 
(9)). In the first three result columns of Table 3 we run regressions with a parsimonious 
specification  where  corruption  mainly  depends  on  social  interaction  when  anticorruption 
efforts are controlled. In the following three columns we only include control variables which 
are not highly correlated with other explanatory variables into our specification to minimize 
multicollinearity. In the next three columns of Table 3, results of the full specification are 13 
 
presented. Overall the results presented in Table 3 indicate that there is a positive and highly 
statistically significant relationship between social interactions and corruption. Both, global 
and local interactions matter and the findings are quite robust through all the specifications. 
Furthermore, the effect of social interaction on corruption is sizable. Other things being equal, 
one standard deviation increase in local interaction (           ) raises provincial registered 
cases of corruption per 100,000 people between 41% and 78% of a standard deviation, while 
an increment of global interaction              by one standard deviation is associated with an 
extra  11%  to  23%  increase  of  a  standard  deviation  in  provincial  registered  cases  on 
corruption per 100,000 people. Thus, it looks as if social interaction is a key element in 
understanding corruption.   
   Besides social interaction, other explanatory variables are also observed to generally have 
the expected effects on corruption in our econometric analysis
3. The results in the regressions 
indicate  that  anticorruption  efforts  and  fiscal  decentralization  significantly  decrease 
corruption,  while  resource  abundance  is  observed  to  substantially  increase  corruption. 
According to the  Arellano-Bover/Blundell-Bond estimation in Column (6) and (9), though 
insignificant, deregulation, the relative wage of the public sector and female representation in 
the National People’s Congress are negatively correlated with corruption. In Column (9), 
education  reduces  corruption,  while  higher  income  is  weakly  correlated  with  the  higher 
incidence of corruption (not statistically significant), which seems to contradict most previous 
studies involved. Such a result might be driven by the transitional nature of Chinese society. 
Actually  countries  making  the  transition  to  a  market  economy  often  experience 
unprecedented  corruption  (Levin  and  Satarov  2000;  Paldam  and  Svendsen  2000).  China 
specifically began its transitional process when economic reform loosened up its economy; 
however, political reform has lagged behind. Therefore, in the absence of institutional and 
legal  constraints,  government  continues  to  play  an  extensive  role  in  China’s  economic 
environment. One  unavoidable  consequence  of such involvement is corruption, a type  of 
corruption  that  becomes  more  pervasive  when  government  power  is  widened  through 
increased economic activity. As a result, regions with higher income levels may be more 
corrupt. Trade openness and media variables in our regression (9) had an unexpected sign, 
which  might  be  due  to  multicollinearity.  Actually,  in  Column  (10)  and  (11)  when  trade 
openness and media are included without other highly correlated variables, they both have 
expected signs and are even statistically significant. 
                                                           
3  Although some are not statistically significant.   14 
 
Table 3        Corruption and social interaction 
Annual Cases (1998—2007) 
  Pooled   
OLS 




Pooled   
OLS 




Pooled   
OLS 








  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9)  (10)  (11) 
Casest-1  0.81***  0.43***  0.64***  0.78***  0.41***  0.58***  0.74***  0.41***  0.52***  0.64***  0.64*** 
  (0.040)  (0.064)  (0.11)  (0.043)  (0.063)  (0.11)  (0.046)  (0.064)  (0.078)  (0.12)  (0.11) 
Bordert  0.16***  0.35***  0.31***  0.17***  0.23**  0.34***  0.12**  0.22*  0.24**  0.42***  0.34** 
  (0.044)  (0.11)  (0.11)  (0.046)  (0.12)  (0.092)  (0.049)  (0.12)  (0.10)  (0.15)  (0.14) 
Anticorruptiont-1  -0.0014***  -0.0021***  -0.0018***  -0.00089***  -0.0016*  -0.00027  -0.0029***  -0.0015  -0.0017     
  (0.00029)  (0.00071)  (0.00043)  (0.00033)  (0.00087)  (0.00077)  (0.00094)  (0.0017)  (0.0020)     
Resourcet-1        0.011  0.072**  0.075**  0.015  0.072**  0.090***     
        (0.0098)  (0.031)  (0.036)  (0.0100)  (0.032)  (0.029)     
Decentralizationt-1        -0.014**  -0.025***  -0.020***  -0.018***  -0.025***  -0.020***  -0.020**  -0.021*** 
        (0.0060)  (0.0035)  (0.0062)  (0.0041)  (0.0039)  (0.0070)  (0.0085)  (0.0074) 
Regulationt-1        -0.015  -0.063*  -0.043  -0.052**  -0.035  -0.071     
        (0.012)  (0.035)  (0.046)  (0.022)  (0.040)  (0.048)     
Femalet-1        -0.52  0.57  -0.48  -0.79  0.43  -2.79  -0.75  -0.071 
        (0.95)  (1.15)  (2.11)  (1.02)  (1.21)  (1.99)  (2.53)  (1.92) 
Waget-1        0.021  0.43  -0.23  -0.077  0.37  -0.32  -0.88  -0.74 
        (0.20)  (0.37)  (0.59)  (0.23)  (0.38)  (0.45)  (0.64)  (0.59) 
Incomet-1              0.17  -0.065  0.073     
              (0.11)  (0.22)  (0.26)     
Educationt-1              0.0100  -0.027  -0.052*     
              (0.018)  (0.031)  (0.031)     
Opennesst-1              0.0062**  0.0037  0.020**    -0.0046* 
              (0.0027)  (0.0051)  (0.0085)    (0.0025) 
Mediat-1              -0.000026  -0.0037  0.000044  -0.0024*   
              (0.00060)  (0.0030)  (0.0012)  (0.0015)   
Constant  0.23  0.91**  0.35  0.40  0.82  0.62  -0.36  1.62  1.33  0.81  1.05 
  (0.15)  (0.37)  (0.28)  (0.30)  (0.69)  (1.03)  (0.77)  (2.06)  (2.19)  (0.92)  (0.80) 
AR(2)Test      [0.21]      [0.18]      [0.20]  [0.17]  [0.16] 
R-squared  0.77  0.83    0.78  0.84    0.78  0.85       
Observations  279  279  279  277  277  277  276  276  276  278   
Note:    Robust standard errors in parentheses; p-values in brackets; ***, **, and * denote significance at 1%, 5%, and 10%, respectively.15 
 
IV. CONCLUSIONS 
In this paper, we explore theoretically and empirically whether social interaction influences 
the  incidence  of  corruption  in  China.  We  first  present  an  interaction-based  model  on 
corruption that leads to the theoretical prediction that corruption is positively associated with 
social interaction. We have differentiated in the paper between local interaction (proxied as 
the lagged corruption values as closely interacting bureaucrats are bureaucrats within the 
same region), and global interaction (average of corruption levels in neighbour provinces). 
Then we test the theoretical prediction applying an empirical analysis using province-level 
data in China over the period 1998 to2007. Empirical evidence clearly indicates that social 
interactions,  both  local  and  global  interaction,  have  a  significantly  positive  effect  on  the 
corruption rate in China. Our findings therefore underscore the relevance of social interaction, 
an aspect that has long been discussed in economics (see, e.g., Smith, 1759/1976, Veblen, 
1899 and Duesenberry, 1949). Interestingly, many traditional models have treated cooperation 
or compliance with rules as an isolated case. However, individuals do not normally act as 
isolated individuals playing a game against nature. The behaviour of others (individuals or 
regions) is important to understand compliance. Hence, theories of pro-social behaviour, which 
take the impact of behaviour or the preferences of others into account, are promising. The 
concept of pro-social behaviour can be widely applied in daily life. For example, the broken 
windows  theory  suggests  that  ―signs  of  inappropriate  behaviour  like  graffiti  or  broken 
windows lead to other inappropriate behaviour (e.g. litter or stealing)‖ (Keizer et al. 2008, 
p.1685). The theory has strongly influenced law enforcement strategies in several US cities 
such as New York, Chicago, Baltimore, Boston and Los Angeles aiming at maintaining order 
by dealing more aggressively with minor offenses (Harcourt and Ludwig, 2006). 
   There are important policy implications based on our findings. Regional corruption is 
affected by neighbourhood corruption. Successful anti-corruption activities in one area have 
positive spillover effects on reducing corruption in other (contiguous) areas. To efficiently 
control  corruption  neighbouring  areas  should  either  coordinate  their  individual 
anti-corruption  efforts  with  regional  agreements  or  policy  makers  should  take  spillover 
effects into account when allocating resources. This is particularly relevant when corruption 
is widespread. On the other hand, a critical mass of cooperative behaviour (low level of 
corruption) can induce  a positive dynamic process  of conditional cooperation.  Moreover, 
previous corruption levels have a significant effect on the current corruption level. Evolution 
of  corruption  is  a  path-dependent  process.  Policies  should  take  into  account  such 16 
 
path-dependent processes within a society. The closer a region is to the threshold or tipping 
point, the easier it is to influence the dynamic conditional cooperative processes. However, 
identifying  such  a  tipping  point  is  not  without  problems.  One  possibility  is  to  change 
underlying  institutional  conditions  at  the  local  level.  In  general,  rigorous  anti-corruption 
measures  need  to  be  carried  out  for  a  long  period  to  control  corruption  in  areas  where 
corruption is pandemic. As suggested by Aidt (2003), a ―big push‖ like the one that took 
place in Hong Kong in the 1970s, might be needed to address the corruption levels in areas 





Table A1      Average annual registered cases on corruption per capita across regions in China (1998-2007) 
Region 
Average annual registered 
cases per 100,000 Pop. 
Region 
Average annual registered 
cases per 100,000 Pop. 
Region 
Average annual registered 
cases per 100,000 Pop. 
Tianjin  5.01  Shaanxi  3.15  Yunnan  2.61 
Heilongjiang  4.77  Qinghai  3.08  Hunan  2.59 
Jilin  4.50  Ningxia  3.08  Hainan  2.59 
Liaoning  4.12  Hubei  3.05  Beijing  2.59 
Shanxi  3.83  Guizhou  2.95  Chongqing  2.49 
Hebei  3.67  Zhejiang  2.91  Anhui  2.36 
Shandong  3.62 
Inner 
Mongolia 
2.77  Sichuan  2.35 
Xinjiang  3.41  Shanghai  2.77  Gansu  2.05 
Fujian  3.40  Jiangsu  2.71  Guangdong  2.05 
Henan  3.35  Guangxi  2.64  Tibet  1.77 
Jiangxi  3.29         
 
 
Table A2      Pairwise correlation coefficients between variables 
  Corruption  Border  Anticorruption  Income  Education  Wage  Openness  Regulation  Media  Resource  Female  Decentralization 
Corruption  1.00                       
Border  0.32  1.00                     
Anticorruption  -0.20  0.25  1.00                   
Income  0.04  0.34  0.78  1.00                 
Education  0.06  0.44  0.79  0.75  1.00               
Wage  -0.05  0.01  0.23  0.38  0.14  1.00             
Openness  -0.08  0.42  0.76  0.75  0.81  0.27  1.00           
Regulation  -0.15  -0.03  0.25  0.54  0.33  0.31  0.39  1.00         
Media  -0.06  0.40  0.58  0.51  0.78  0.09  0.75  0.15  1.00       
Resource  0.39  0.04  -0.37  -0.30  -0.22  -0.33  -0.43  -0.27  -0.26  1.00     
Female  -0.24  0.23  0.19  0.14  0.24  0.20  0.29  0.08  0.49  -0.15  1.00   
Decentralization  -0.08  0.28  0.52  0.39  0.46  0.01  0.46  -0.08  0.41  -0.18  0.17  1.00 17 
 
REFERENCES 
Ades, A., & Di Tella, R. (1999). Rents, Competition and Corruption. American Economic Review 89, 982-993. 
Aidt, T. S. (2003). Economic Analysis of Corruption: A Survey. The Economic Journal 113, 632-652. 
Anderson, T.,  & Hsiao, C. (1981). Estimation of  Dynamic Models  with Error Components. Journal of the 
American Statistical Association 76, 598-606. 
Andvig, J. C., & Moene, K.O. (1990). How Corruption May Corrupt. Journal of Economic Behaviour and 
Organization 13, 63-76. 
Attila, G. (2008). Is Corruption Contagious? An Econometric Analysis. Norwegian Institute of International 
Affairs Working Paper, No. 742. 
Arellano, M., & Bond, S. (1991). Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data: Monte Carlo Evidence and an 
Application to Employment Equations. Review of Economic Studies 58, 277-297. 
Arellano, M., & Bover, O. (1995). Another Look at the Instrumental-Variable Estimation of Error-Components 
Models. Journal of Econometrics 68, 29-51. 
Bikhchandani, S., Hirshleifer, D., & Welch, I. (1998). Learning from the Behaviour of Others: Conformity, Fads, 
and Informational Cascades. Journal of Economic Perspectives 12, 151-170 
Blume,  L.  E.,  &  Durlauf,  S.N.  (2004).  The  Interactions-Based  Approach  to  Socioeconomic  Behaviour.  In   
Social Dynamics, Steven N. Durlauf, H. Peyton Young (eds.), The MIT Press. 
Blundell,  R.W.,  &  Bond,  S.R.  (1998).  Initial  Conditions  and  Moment  Restrictions  in  Dynamic  Panel  Data 
Models. Journal of Econometrics 87, 115-143. 
Brock, W. A., & Durlauf, S.N. (1995). Discrete Choice with Social Interactions I: Theory. NBER Working 
Papers No. 5291. 
Brock, W. A. and Durlauf, S.N., 2001. Discrete Choice with Social Interactions. The Review of Economic 
Studies 68, 235-260. 
Brunetti, A., & Weder, B. (2003). A Free Press is Bad News for Corruption. Journal of Public Economics 87, 
1801-1824. 
Cai, H., Fang, H., & Xu, C.L. (2009). Eat, Drink, Firms and Government: An Investigation of Corruption from 
Entertainment and Travel Costs of Chinese Firms. Journal of Law and Economics, forthcoming. 
Dong, B., Dulleck, U., & Torgler, B. (2008). Conditional Corruption. CREMA Working Paper Series 2008-29.   
Duesenberry, J.S. (1949). Income, Saving, and the Theory of Consumer Behaviour. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Fisman, R., & Gatti, R. (2002). Decentralization and Corruption: Evidence from U.S. Federal Transfer Programs. 
Public Choice 113, 25-35. 
Glaeser, E.L., Sacerdote, B., & Scheinkman, J.A. (1996). Crime and Social Interactions. The Quarterly Journal 
of Economics 111, 507-548. 
Glaeser, E.L., & Saks, R.E. (2006). Corruption in America. Journal of Public Economics 90, 1053-1072. 
Glaeser,  E.L.,  &  Scheinkman,  J.A.  (2002).  Non-Market  Interactions.  in  Advances  in  Economics  and 
Econometrics: Theory and Applications, Eight World Congress, M. Dewatripont, L.P. Hansen, and S. 
Turnovsky (eds.), Cambridge University Press. 18 
 
Goel,  R.K.,  &  Nelson,  M.A.  (1998).  Corruption  and  Government  Size:  A  Disaggregated  Analysis.  Public 
Choice 97, 107-120. 
Goel, R. K., & Nelson, M.A. (2007). Are Corrupt Acts Contagious? Evidence from the United States. Journal of 
Policy Modelling 29, 839-850. 
Gong, T. (2006). Corruption and Local Governance: the Double Identity of Chinese Local Governments in 
Market Reform. The Pacific Review 19, 85-102. 
Harcourt, B.E., & Ludwig, J. (2006). Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City 
Social Experiment. University of Chicago Law Review 73, 271-320 
Hsiao, C. (2003). Analysis of Panel Data. Cambridge University Press, New York. 
Hu, A. (2001). Corruption and Social Inequality. Jiangsu Social Sciences 3, 51-53. 
Kaufmann, D. (1997). Corruption: The Facts. Foreign Policy 107, 114-131. 
Keizer, K., Lindenberg, S., & Steg, L. (2008). The Spreading of Disorder. Science 322, 1681–1685. 
Lambsdorff, J.G. (2005). Consequences and Causes of Corruption—What do We Know from A Cross-Section 
of Countries? University of Passau discussion paper #V-34-05. 
Levin, M., & Satarov, G. (2000). Corruption and institutions in Russia. European Journal of Political Economy 
16, 113-132. 
Liang, G. (1994). The Practical Encyclopaedia of Anti-Corruption in China and Foreign Countries. Beijing, 
Xinhua Press. 
Lui, F. T. (1985). An Equilibrium Queueing Model of Bribery. Journal of Political Economy 93, 760–781.Lui, 
F.T. (1986). A Dynamic Model of Corruption Deterrence. Journal of Public Economics 31, 215-236. 
Mauro, P. (1995). Corruption and Growth. The Quarterly Journal of Economics 110, 681-712. 
Mo, P.H. (2001). Corruption and Economic Growth. Journal of Comparative Economics 29, 66-79. 
Paldam, M., & Svendsen, G.T. (2000). Missing Social Capital and the Transition in Eastern Europe. Working 
Papers 00-5, Aarhus School of Business, Department of Economics. 
Rose-Ackerman, S. (1997). The Political Economy of Corruption. in Corruption and the Global Economy, K. A. 
Elliott (eds.), Washington D.C.: Institute for International Economics 31-60. 
Rose-Ackerman,  S.  (1999).  Corruption  and  Government:  Causes,  Consequences,  and  Reform.  Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press.   
Sah, R. (1988). Persistence and Pervasiveness of Corruption: New Perspectives. Discussion Paper No. 560, 
Economic Growth Centre, Yale University. 
Sah, R.. (1991). Social Osmosis and Pattern of Crime. Journal of Political Economy 99, 1272-1295. 
Sah, R.. (2005). Large and Persistent Differences in Corruption across Countries and Regions. Working Paper 
No 2003-13. 
Sah, R.. (2007). Corruption across Countries and Regions: Some Consequences of Local Osmosis. Journal of 
Economic Dynamics & Control 31, 2573–2598. 
Scheinkman, J. A.  (2008). Social Interactions. in The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics (2
nd ed.), S. 
Durlauf & L. Blume (eds.), Palgrave Macmillan. 
Smith, A. (1759/1976). The Theory of Moral Sentiments. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 
Swamy,  A.,  Knack,  S.,  Lee,  Y.,  &  Azfar,  O.  (2001).  Gender  and  Corruption.  Journal  of  Development 
Economics 64, 25-55. 19 
 
Treisman, D. (2000). The Causes of Corruption: A Cross-National Study. Journal of Public Economics 76, 
399-457. 
Treisman,  D.  (2007).  What  Have  We  Learned  About  the  Causes  of  Corruption  From  Ten  Years  of 
Cross-National Empirical Research? Annual Review of Political Science 10, 211-244. 
Veblen, T. (1899). The Theory of the Leisure Class. New York: MacMillan. 
Wei, S.-J. (2000). How Taxing is Corruption on International Investors. Review of Economics and Statistics 82, 
1-11. 
White, G. (1996). Corruption and the Transition from Socialism in China. Journal of Law and society 23, 
149-169 
Wooldridge, J.M. (2002). Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and Panel Data. MIT Press; Cambridge. 
World Bank, (1997). Helping Countries Combat Corruption: The Role of the World Bank. Poverty Reduction 
and Economic Management, World Bank. 
Yao,  S.  (2002).  Privilege  and  Corruption:  The  Problems  of  China's  Socialist  Market  Economy.  American 
Journal of Economics and Sociology 61, 279-299. 
Zanella,  G.  (2004).  Social  Interactions  and  Economic  Behaviour.  Working  paper  No.  411,  Department  of 
Economics, University of Siena. 
Zhang, T., & Zou, H.-F. (1998). Fiscal Decentralization, Public Spending, and Economic Growth in China. 
Journal of Public Economics 67, 221-240. 